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I.  OVERVIEW 
Currently, there is a circuit split on the issue of whether early retirement 
payments (ERPs) made to tenured faculty constitute wages subject to Federal 
Insurance Contribution Act (FICA)1 taxation.  In North Dakota State University v. 
United States, the Eighth Circuit held that ERPs made to tenured faculty do not 
constitute FICA wages because such payments are made to purchase the 
constitutionally protected property interest that tenured faculty hold in their tenure 
rights.2  However, the Sixth and Third Circuits, in Appoloni v. United States3 and 
                                                                
* With all love and thanks to my wife, Sofia, and my sons, Aidan and Marcos—any 
success I have had at Cleveland-Marshall is the product of your support and patience.  This 
Note was selected for the 2009-2010 Cleveland State Law Review Oustanding Note Award. 
1
 I.R.C. §§ 3101-28 (2006). 
2
 N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599 (8th Cir. 2001). 
3
 Appoloni v. United States, 450 F.3d 185 (6th Cir. 2006). 
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University of Pittsburgh v. United States4 respectively, held that such payments do 
constitute FICA wages because the ERPs were made in consideration of past service 
within the employment relationship.  
This issue of whether ERPs made to tenured faculty constitute wages subject to 
FICA taxation is a recurring and costly issue that requires resolution.  First, a 
primary concern of the federal tax system is the avoidance of disparate treatment 
between similarly situated taxpayers.5  Second, beyond achieving the ideal of 
uniform treatment under the federal tax system, taxpayers simply need to know what 
actions to take—the what, when, why, and how of both tax compliance and tax 
planning.  Furthermore, this is a crucial issue for not only the individual taxpayer, 
but for the associated institutions as well.6 
This Note will demonstrate that the Third and Sixth Circuits correctly held that 
ERPs made to tenured faculty constitute wages subject to taxation under FICA.7  Part 
II will provide the pertinent facts, consider the legal analysis conducted by each 
court, and argue that there is no material factual distinction among these cases.  Part 
III will present the FICA framework and address the definition of wages in that 
context.  Part IV will examine Revenue Rulings promulgated by the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) and discuss the level of judicial deference that Revenue 
Rulings merit.  Part V will examine the specific Revenue Rulings associated with 
this issue and the role the rulings played in each court’s analysis.  Furthermore, it 
will be demonstrated that the Third Circuit’s and Sixth Circuit’s analyses, especially 
related to the Revenue Rulings, correspond most accurately with the purposes of 
both the concept of tenure and the ERPs in question, which were made to secure 
early retirement rather than to “buy” property rights. 
II.  THE THREE CASES 
A.  Background 
In North Dakota State University v. United States, the Eighth Circuit 
unanimously affirmed the district court’s finding that ERPs made to tenured faculty 
do not constitute wages and, therefore, “are not subject to FICA taxation.”8  This was 
                                                                
4
 Univ. of Pittsburgh v. United States, 507 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2007). 
5
 See, e.g., Nickell v. Comm’r., 831 F.2d 1265, 1270 (6th Cir. 1987) (“‘Uniformity among 
the circuits is especially important in tax cases to ensure equal and certain administration of 
the tax system.  We would therefore hesitate to reject the view of another circuit.’” (quoting 
First Charter Fin. Corp. v. United States, 669 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1982))); see also 
Golsen v. Comm’r., 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970) (noting that “better judicial administration[] 
requires [the U.S. Tax Court] to follow a Court of Appeals decision which is squarely in point 
where appeal from [the Tax Court] decision lies to that Court of Appeals,” despite the fact that 
the U.S. Tax Court is a national court with its own precedents (internal footnote omitted)). 
6
 Univ. of Pittsburgh, 507 F.3d at 167.  For example, the University of Pittsburgh sought 
refunds for payments made between 1996 and 2001 totaling $2,196,942, which constituted 
only the university’s liability for the ERP payments.  Id. 
7
 See I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3111. 
8
 N.D. State Univ., 255 F.3d at 607. 
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not only “an issue of first impression in the [Eighth Circuit],”9 but the court also 
noted that only one federal district court had addressed the issue prior to this case.10 
The North Dakota State University (NDSU) instituted a voluntary ERP program 
for eligible11 tenured12 professors.13  If a qualified employee agreed to participate in 
the early retirement program, the parties negotiated the amount of the ERPs based on 
multiple factors, such as “past performance, current salary, curriculum needs, and 
budget restraints.”14  As one of the conditions of participation in the ERP program, 
the participating employee agreed to relinquish any tenure15 or contractual rights.16 
Initially, NDSU paid its share and withheld each employee’s portion of FICA 
taxes.17  Some of the participating members questioned this practice, and the 
university eventually stopped withholding and paying FICA taxes in 1991 based 
upon information received in a letter issued by the Social Security Administration 
                                                                
9
 Id. at 603.  This issue was one of first impression in not only the Eighth Circuit, but also 
in all of the federal circuits.  Id. 
10
  Id. at 603 n.5 (citing Slotta v. Tex. A. & M. Univ. Sys., No. G-93-125, 1994 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21205, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1994) (reasoning that a payment for the 
relinquishment of tenure pursuant to a settlement agreement would not constitute wages 
because the professor did not earn tenure; rather, the institution offered tenure as a term of the 
initial employment, and as such it could not be characterized as payment for past services)).  
11
 Id. at 601.  The eligibility requirements varied slightly during the years in question, but 
generally a faculty member’s “age and years of service [must have] totaled [seventy]” in order 
to qualify for participation in the ERP program.  Id. 
12
 Id. The university maintained “a tenure track of six years, during which time faculty 
members were evaluated annually.”  Id.  The six-year timeframe could be decreased or 
eliminated “for faculty having tenure at another university or having a record of outstanding 
achievement.”  Id.  Once a candidate received tenure, the employment relationship from that 
point was characterized by a series of one-year contracts, which renewed automatically unless 
there were sufficient grounds for termination.  Id.  Termination, however, was possible only 
(1) based on various financial factors or just cause regarding performance, and (2) after 
appropriate “due process rights and procedures.”  Id.  
13
 Id.  The ERP program was also available to certain highly compensated administrative 
officials.  Id. 
14
 Id.  This list of factors was not exhaustive, however, and the court noted that several 
factors could have been considered during the negotiations.  Id. 
15
 Id.; see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (holding that tenure is a 
constitutionally protected property right).  Summarizing the right and the relinquishment 
process, the Eighth Circuit stated that “the faculty who gave up their tenure rights at NDSU in 
exchange for early retirement gave up the right not only to invoke proper procedure before 
tenure was lost, but a right not to lose tenure at all without justification.”  N.D. State Univ., 
255 F.3d at 605. 
16
 N.D. State Univ., 255 F.3d. at 601.  ERP participants were required to relinquish other 
rights beyond tenure, such as the right to pursue age-discrimination claims against the 
university or the right to pursue employment at another North Dakota public academic 
institution.  Id. 
17
 Id. at 602.  The university initially understood that the ERP payments would create 
FICA liability for the institution and the ERP participants.  Id. 
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(SSA).18  The IRS audited NDSU in 1995, and, at that point, the university returned 
to the practice of paying and withholding FICA.19 
The court began its analysis by noting that the definition of “wages” for purposes 
of FICA is construed broadly.20  Despite the broad definition of wages, the court 
focused on the fact that payments for wages “must be remuneration for services 
provided by the employee.”21  From this perspective, the court recognized closely 
related but distinct tax principles evident in IRS Revenue Rulings that were possibly 
applicable to the facts at hand.22  Before analyzing each Revenue Ruling, the court 
first noted that Revenue Rulings merit judicial deference, especially in cases of first 
impression.23 
The court noted the value inherent in tenure as a property right, even though 
tenure is not an entity that can be exchanged in the marketplace.24  In addition, the 
court stated that “tenure is not [an] automatic [right]” that vests simply by the 
passage of time, and, in fact, the focus of achieving tenure is not on past service at 
all.25  The court found that two successive relationships exist and reasoned that 
tenured professors received negotiated ERPs in exchange for the relinquishment of 
tenure, a property right obtained at the onset of the tenured (second) relationship.26  
The ERP recipients did not receive what they should have under their contracts 
because “they relinquished their tenure rights,”27 and, therefore, the court held that 
the ERPs did not constitute wages “subject to FICA taxation.”28 
                                                                
18
 Id.  In a letter to the Social Security Administration (SSA), NDSU referred to the ERP 
program as a “Tenure Buy-Out Program,” wherein the university would purchase tenure rights 
from eligible employees.  Id.  The SSA letter in return stated that the payments were akin to 
payments for the relinquishment of an unexpired employment contract and that such payments 
were not subject to FICA liability.  Id.  The university did not secure an opinion or ruling from 
the IRS.  Id. 
19
 Id.  The university was audited by the IRS, which “assessed deficiencies in FICA taxes 
for the years 1991 through 1994.”  Id.  NDSU paid the assessed deficiency, resumed the 
practice of withholding and paying FICA tax for the ERP payments, and eventually “filed for 
a refund of the FICA taxes for the periods of 1991 through 1997.”  Id. 
20
 Id. at 603 (citing Soc. Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 364-66 (1946)). 
21
 Id. 
22
 Id. at 603-05. 
23
 Id. at 604 n.6 (“Because there is no case law directly on point, we find revenue rulings 
especially useful in analyzing the issue before us.”). 
24
 Id. at 605. 
25
 Id. (noting that “tenure is much more than a recognition for past services”). 
26
 Id. at 606-07. 
27
 Id. at 607.  The court noted that the relinquishment of contractual rights was the 
distinguishing factor between tenured professors and administrators, whose ERPs were held to 
constitute wages subject to FICA taxation.  Id. 
28
 Id. 
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Five years after NDSU, the Sixth Circuit held in Appoloni v. United States that 
ERPs made to tenured faculty do constitute wages subject to FICA taxation.29  Two 
cases were consolidated on appeal in Appoloni, one in which the court found for the 
plaintiffs30 and one in which the court found for the government.31 
Rather than a university setting, each of the cases consolidated in Appoloni 
involved tenured public school teachers.32  While there were subtle variations in the 
program details, both instances involved an ERP program offered to eligible teachers 
based on age and seniority with the purpose of inducing retirement.33  As in NDSU, 
program participants were required to waive tenure rights.34  The school districts paid 
FICA and correctly withheld the participants’ shares, but those individuals filed 
refund claims based upon the outcome in NDSU, which the IRS denied.35 
Like the Eighth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit also began its analysis with an 
examination of the definition of “wages.”36  While the court stressed the concept of 
employee service, it emphasized that the broad definition of wages does not include 
only productive activity.37  The court focused on the program eligibility requirements 
                                                                
29
 Appoloni v. United States, 450 F.3d 185, 187 (6th Cir. 2006). 
30
 Klender v. United States, 328 F.Supp. 2d 754, 767 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (holding that 
ERPs to tenured educators do not constitute FICA wages), rev’d, Appoloni v. United States, 
450 F.3d 185 (6th Cir. 2006). 
31
 Appoloni v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 2d 624, 631 (W.D. Mich. 2004) (holding that 
ERPs to tenured educators constitute FICA wages), aff’d, 450 F.3d 185 (6th Cir. 2006). 
32
 Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 187.  Unlike NDSU and University of Pittsburgh, Appoloni 
involved tenured public school teachers.  The question of whether this fact is of material 
distinction is addressed infra Part II.B.  However, there is no dispute that the tenure rights 
relinquished by educators, whether in public schools or in institutions of higher learning, are 
materially indistinguishable. 
33
 Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 187-88.  The ERP programs in Klender and Appoloni varied 
slightly, but the basic principles were similar, not only to one another, but also to the program 
design in NDSU.  The target employees were teachers with high salaries and years of service 
ranging from ten to twenty years.  Id.  In both instances, the court noted that the stated purpose 
of each program was to ease financial constraints by inducing retirement of the most senior 
and highly paid teachers.  Id. 
34
 Id. at 188.  As in NDSU, the teachers were required to waive claims to subsequent 
increases in wages or benefits, and also could not seek reemployment without the school 
board’s consent.  Id.; see also N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599, 601-02 (8th 
Cir. 2001). 
35
 Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 188.  The school withheld and made the appropriate payments for 
the FICA liability but immediately filed for refund, which the IRS denied.  Id. 
36
 Id. at 189-90.  Although the Eighth Circuit considered the definition of FICA wages 
only in very general terms, the Sixth Circuit examined this issue in greater detail.  However, 
both courts agreed that the broad definition of FICA wages was correct.  Id. at 190 (referring 
to wages in the FICA context and noting that “[b]oth the Supreme Court and this circuit have 
emphasized the broad, inclusive nature of this definition”); N.D. State Univ., 255 F.3d at 603 
(“[W]ages and employment are read broadly in the FICA context . . . .”). 
37
 Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 190 (“The [United States Supreme] Court specifically rejected the 
argument that ‘service’ as used in the [Social Security] Act should be limited to ‘only 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
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and emphasized the fact that the requirements were based on a minimum number of 
years of service and related factors that arose out of the employment relationship.38  
In addition, the court noted that relinquishment of tenure rights does not change the 
fact that ERPs are wages, because the relevant consideration is not what rights are 
relinquished but, rather, how those rights are earned.39  Furthermore, the court 
indicated that the schools did not exchange the payments for tenure rights—the point 
was to get teachers to retire early in order to save money.40  Accordingly, the court 
concluded that the ERPs were the same as severance packages, which regularly call 
for employees to relinquish various rights.41 
The court then supported this position in light of the same Revenue Rulings 
examined in NDSU, and it also addressed the issue of the correct level of judicial 
deference to such rulings.42  The court agreed with the Government that the most 
analogous ruling was that which focused on employee rights acquired through 
service43 and concluded by noting the difference between its ruling and that of the 
NDSU court.44 
The Appoloni decision was not unanimous, and the dissent disagreed on two 
main points: a broad definition of FICA wages was incorrect,45 and severance 
payments would not have been paid had the ERP program participants not 
relinquished their tenure rights.46  The dissent concluded that it would follow the 
Eighth Circuit47 and would accord similar deference and interpretation to the 
Revenue Ruling upon which the NDSU court relied.48 
                                                          
productive activity’ and emphasized the broad nature of the definition of FICA ‘wages.’” 
(quoting Soc. Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1946))). 
38
 Id.  Such factors included years of service, current salary, and the method of calculating 
the ERP.  Id. 
39
 Id. at 192-93. 
40
 Id. at 193.  As such, the ERPs were in essence severance payments, which are subject to 
FICA taxation.  Id. 
41
 Id. (citing Abrahamsen v. United States, 228 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also 
Associated Elec. Coop., Inc. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1322, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(finding that because the employer’s motivations for offering the plan “were not solely to 
avoid labor unrest,” the payments “fit within the statutory definition of ‘wages’”).  
42
 Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 193-94; see also discussion infra Part IV.B. 
43
 Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 194. 
44
 Id. at 195; see also discussion infra Part II.B. 
45
 Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 199-201 (Griffin, J., dissenting); see also discussion infra Part III. 
46
 Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 202-03.  
47
 Id. at 203.  Contrary to the majority opinion, the dissent also contended that the 
Appoloni facts were materially indistinguishable from the NDSU facts.  Id.; see also 
discussion infra Part II.B. 
48
 Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 203-04. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss1/8
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One year later, a divided Third Circuit considered the same issue in University of 
Pittsburgh v. United States and sided with the Sixth Circuit.49  The facts and program 
details in University of Pittsburgh were very similar to NDSU.50  The university first 
paid and withheld the FICA liability; the taxpayers sought a refund, which the IRS 
denied.51 
Again, the court began by examining the definition of wages and found, just as 
the previous two courts had, that a broad interpretation of wages is correct.52  The 
court then turned to the Revenue Rulings, dealing first with the level of deference 
and then providing a description of each ruling.53  From this foundation, the court 
first noted that the ERP program eligibility requirements were specifically linked to 
past service.54  Second, the ERP program clearly stated that the payments constituted 
compensation for services.55  Third, even if tenure relinquishment was a factor, it 
was secondary to the goal of inducing retirement, and, therefore, the payments were 
essentially severance payments.56  The court concluded that its view focusing on past 
service corresponded most directly to the Revenue Ruling relied upon by the 
Government, and it noted that the Sixth Circuit correctly emphasized the manner in 
which relinquished rights were earned, rather than just the nature of the rights.57  
B.  The Three Cases Are Materially Indistinguishable on Their Facts 
The fact that NDSU and University of Pittsburgh involved university professors 
and Appoloni involved public school teachers raises the question of whether these 
cases are materially distinguishable on their facts.  Both Appoloni and University of 
Pittsburgh addressed this question to varying degrees and arrived at different 
conclusions.  The Third Circuit correctly concluded that there are no materially 
distinguishing factors between these cases because there is no material difference in 
(1) the process through which university professors and public school teachers obtain 
                                                                
49
 Univ. of Pittsburgh v. United States, 507 F.3d 165, 166 (3d Cir. 2007).  The divided 
opinion in University of Pittsburgh overturned the district court’s finding that the ERP 
payments did not constitute wages.  Id. 
50
 Id. at 166-67.  In University of Pittsburgh, there were a total of five ERP programs, each 
of which maintained minimum age and length of service eligibility requirements.  All 
individuals were required to relinquish tenure as a precondition of participation.  Id.  
51
 Id. at 167.  The university paid in excess of two million dollars between 1996 and 2001, 
which represented only the university’s share of FICA taxes due on the payments.  Id. 
52
 Id. at 167-68; see also supra note 36. 
53
 Univ. of Pittsburgh, 507 F.3d at 168-71.  Although arriving at the same conclusion that 
the Revenue Rulings in this case merit some deference, the Third Circuit approached the 
general question of judicial deference to Revenue Rulings in a different manner than the 
Eighth and Sixth Circuits.  Id. 
54
 Id. at 171-72.  The court emphasized that the factors focused on the service requirement 
while completely disregarding the relinquishment of tenure and/or contract rights.  Id. 
55
 Id. at 172.  The plan clearly noted the financial motivation in compensating highly paid 
professors for accepting early retirement.  Id. 
56
 Id. at 172-73. 
57
 Id. at 174. 
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tenure, and (2) the property right that university professors and public school 
teachers relinquish upon entry into an ERP program.58 
Immediately after the Sixth Circuit stated that the ERPs constituted wages subject 
to FICA taxation, the court expressly acknowledged that both the ruling and 
underlying rationale differed from that in NDSU.59  Although the court suggested that 
the cases were factually distinguishable, it did so only in a footnote and did not 
emphasize the factual dissimilarities in the reasoning that led to the disparity 
between the Sixth and Eighth Circuits.60  Instead, the court emphasized the 
difference in rationale between its holding and that of the Eighth Circuit and 
expressly stated that the ruling it had reached in Appoloni was the correct one.61 
Implicit in this statement is the belief that the Eighth Circuit had arrived at the 
wrong conclusion in a case that was materially indistinguishable from Appoloni.  The 
Sixth Circuit’s mention of factual differences was made more as recognition of 
respectful disagreement with its sister circuit.  This is evidenced by the fact that the 
remainder of the opinion following the footnote in question is devoid of any 
explanation, or even suggestion, that Appoloni and NDSU might stand in harmony 
and that no split between the circuits had formed.  Instead, the court summarized its 
rationale and reiterated the disagreement with the rationale of the Eighth Circuit.62  
The method of analysis and the language used by the Sixth Circuit in the conclusion 
indicates a clear recognition of the resulting circuit split on this issue between two 
materially indistinguishable cases. 
Ironically, the Sixth Circuit dissent concluded that the facts in Appoloni and 
NDSU were “materially indistinguishable.”63  The dissent noted that only subtle 
differences existed in the method by which the university professors in NDSU and 
the public school teachers in Appoloni obtained tenure and concluded that the factual 
differences were subtle and not determinative of the outcome in either case.64  
Although the dissent’s view on the ultimate substantive outcome is incorrect, that 
opinion was correct that the minor factual differences by which various individuals 
obtain tenure do not create factually material distinctions relevant to the 
consideration of whether ERPs constitute wages subject to FICA. 
The Third Circuit majority agreed that no material distinction existed between 
Appoloni and NDSU.65  Like the Sixth Circuit, the court addressed this issue only 
briefly in a footnote, demonstrating that subtle differences in various tenure-track 
processes are irrelevant.66  Instead, the court stressed that the general process of how 
                                                                
58
 Id. at 171-74. 
59
 Appoloni v. United States, 450 F.3d 185, 195 (6th Cir. 2006). 
60
 Id. at 195 n.5. 
61
 Id. at 194 (“We recognize our holding . . . differs from what the Eighth Circuit held in 
North Dakota; however we believe that we have reached the correct result.”). 
62
 Id. at 195. 
63
 Id. at 203 (Griffin, J., dissenting). 
64
 Id. 
65
 Univ. of Pittsburgh v. United States, 507 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2007). 
66
 Id. at 174 n.13.   
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one obtains tenure is by “successfully completing a probationary period.”67  This 
demonstrates that, although the precise details may vary, the concept and general 
process for obtaining tenure based on service remains the same, whether the 
individual is a university professor or a public school teacher. 
Those who might argue that Appoloni is distinguishable from NDSU and 
University of Pittsburgh will likely support this position by noting that the Sixth 
Circuit referred to the tenure process for public school teachers as “automatic.”68  
The Third Circuit majority recognized this in the footnote that addressed the question 
of factual differences, and the Third Circuit minority quoted the Sixth Circuit and 
emphasized the concept of automatic tenure in the attempt to distinguish Appoloni 
and NDSU.69  The Third Circuit incorrectly relied on the term “automatic,” which 
was simply an inadequate descriptive term used by the Sixth Circuit to explain a 
subtle difference in the statutorily governed tenure process in place regarding public 
school teachers. 
Although the grant of tenure to public school teachers in Michigan is governed 
by state statute,70 the notion that tenure is obtained automatically is inaccurate.  In 
Michigan, a teacher initially enters a probationary contract period with a public 
school system.71  Once the probationary period has expired, a school district may not 
continue to employ a teacher without a grant of tenure.72  Although this statutorily 
governed process differs from various processes that are in place in institutions of 
higher learning, the process for public school teachers is not automatic.73  Tenure is 
still earned by “satisfactory completion” of the probationary period; just as in the 
university setting, merit is the primary consideration.74 
Consider the following analogy.  To claim that public school teachers gain tenure 
automatically is similar to the claim that law students in the state of Ohio will 
automatically take the bar exam because of their acceptances to law school.  While 
this is not a perfect analogy,75 it does successfully point out the fact that law students 
do not automatically receive the right to sit for the bar just because they have been 
accepted to and entered law school; rather, they must successfully complete law 
school to do so.  Most law students ultimately obtain the right to sit for the bar, but 
                                                                
67
 Id. 
68
 Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 194. 
69
 Univ. of Pittsburgh, 507 F.3d at 177 (Scirica, J., dissenting).  
70
 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 38.71 (West 2009).  
71
 Id. § 38.82. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id.; see also id.  § 38.91. 
74
 Id. §§ 38.82, 38.91.  
75
 There are two points of distinction.  First, not everyone who successfully completes law 
school will elect to sit for the bar exam.  However, this does not change the fact that law 
school graduates have the right to pursue that option, whereas those who have not completed 
law school do not.  Second, although successful completion of law school is necessary to sit 
for the bar, it is not sufficient.  Ohio law school graduates, for example, must also apply and 
be accepted to the state bar, based on additional factors such as financial background and 
character fitness. 
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some do not.  The same is true for Michigan public school teachers, as evidenced by 
those whose contracts were not renewed because they did not earn tenure during the 
probationary employment period. 
In conclusion, these cases are materially indistinguishable because there are only 
subtle factual differences in the processes by which the university professors and the 
public school teachers in question obtained tenure.  Although the public school 
teacher tenure system is governed by statute, it is nonetheless merit-based and not 
automatic.  The focus on these immaterial factual differences reveals an incorrect 
approach to this whole issue.  It is not the specific details of how an educator obtains 
tenure but, rather, the question of what is tenure and how is it obtained on a 
conceptual level that is important.  These questions lie at the heart of analyses and 
determinations regarding the Revenue Rulings presented by the parties in these 
cases.  Does the receipt of tenure mark the beginning of a separate relationship 
without regard to the prior relationship between the individual and the institution, or 
is the prior employment relationship simply altered by a grant of tenure based upon 
the past service of an employee to an employer?  However, before an examination of 
the Revenue Rulings relevant to these cases is possible, it is necessary to establish 
the basic framework of FICA and wages in the FICA context. 
III.  THE DEFINITION OF WAGES IN THE FICA CONTEXT 
A.  The FICA Framework 
The purpose of the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) is to fund the 
Social Security and Medicare benefit programs, which include a wide range of 
services, including insurance programs for the elderly and disabled.76  Both 
employers77 and employees are liable for FICA taxes on payments made to the 
employee as “wages . . . with respect to employment.”78 
Although wages as commonly understood are the main source of FICA taxation, 
liability is imposed on a wider range of payments than would fall under such a 
narrow definition.79  The ERPs to tenured educators are just one example of a form 
of payment that does not neatly fall within the common perception of wages.  When 
considering what should or should not be deemed FICA wages, the manner in which 
                                                                
76
 See I.R.C. §§ 3101-28 (2006); S. REP. NO. 98-23, at 42 (1983), reprinted in 1983 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 143, 183. 
77
 See I.R.C. §§ 3102, 3111. 
78
 Id. § 3101(a)-(b). 
79
 See, e.g., BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FED. TAX’N INCOME, EST. & GIFTS, ¶ 
111.5.2, available at 1997 WL 440074 (W.G.&L.) (2009) (noting that “[t]he terms 
‘compensation for services’ as used by § 61(a)(1) in defining gross income, ‘wages’ as defined 
by § 3401(a) for withholding purposes, and ‘wages’ as defined by § 3121(a) for purposes of 
the FICA . . . overlap in large part and include the overwhelming bulk of wages . . . in the 
layman’s sense.”).  Note, however, that the concept of wages overlaps in the “layman’s 
sense.”  This illustrates that, although a single perception of wages might suffice when 
providing a basic explanation to an individual for a general level of understanding, there are 
specific distinctions in the meaning of wages that have real implications for tax planning and 
compliance, depending on whether one is considering gross income, tax withholding, or FICA. 
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an employer designates or refers to a payment is irrelevant.80  Likewise, neither the 
medium nor the manner of payment is determinative.81  Furthermore, it is important 
to note that the employee bears the burden of demonstrating that a contested payment 
does not constitute wages.  A payment will not be treated as wages if an “employee 
provides clear, separate, and adequate consideration for the employer’s payment that 
is not dependent upon the employer-employee relationship and its component terms 
and conditions.”82  This emphasis on proving consideration that is separate from the 
scope of the employer-employee relationship demonstrates that the key, 
notwithstanding the factors noted above, is understanding how the terms “wages” 
and “employment” are defined in the FICA context. 
The Internal Revenue Code defines “wages” in the FICA context as “all 
remuneration for employment, including the cash value of all remuneration 
(including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash.”83  Although this definition 
seems quite simple, the possibility for ambiguity emerges with the understanding 
that not all income an employee receives from an employer constitutes wages.84  
Wages are comprised of only payments received as “remuneration for 
employment.”85  Therefore, a complete understanding of the definition of “wages” 
depends on the meaning of “employment.” 
The Internal Revenue Code defines “employment” as “any service, of whatever 
nature, performed . . . by an employee for the person employing him.”86  There are 
two distinct components to this definition: wages are payments made (1) within the 
scope of the employer-employee relationship (2) for any service.  While the former 
is both peripheral and easily understood in the context of determining whether ERPs 
to tenured educators constitute wages, the latter is complex and lies at the heart of 
the inquiry. 
First, do ERPs fall within the scope of employment?  If not, then such payments 
cannot be construed as wages, and the inquiry is at an end.  One might think that 
ERPs would not fall under employment because a former employer is making 
payments to a former employee.  However, in terms of defining the scope of 
employment, the term is broadly construed to encompass the entire employer-
employee relationship.87  Consequently, a payment that an employer makes to an 
individual it no longer employs may nonetheless constitute wages because the 
payment is correctly viewed within the broad employment relationship.88  As such, 
                                                                
80
 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(a)-1(c) (2009).  
81
 Id. § 31.3121(a)-1(d), (e). 
82
 See Rev. Rul. 2004-110, 2004-2 C.B. 960. 
83
 I.R.C. § 3121(a). 
84
 See Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 25 (1978).  For example, 
meals and lodgings provided to an employee for the convenience of the employer do not 
constitute FICA wages.  See I.R.C. § 119; see also id. § 3121(a)(19). 
85
 I.R.C. § 3121(a). 
86
 Id. § 3121(b). 
87
 See Soc. Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1946). 
88
 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(a)-1 (2009). 
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there was rightfully no question in these cases that the ERPs were made “with 
respect to employment.”89 
The more difficult task is to determine whether the ERPs were made in exchange 
for “any service.”90  How one defines “service” is crucial because, in essence, it will 
also determine the definition of “wages.”  This is evident in the fact that although the 
focus of the inquiry is on service, the question is generally framed in the context of 
wages—are wages in the FICA context to be construed broadly or narrowly? 
B.  Wages in the FICA Context Are Properly Construed Broadly 
The Supreme Court considered the nature of wages for purposes of social 
security in Social Security Board v. Nierotko.91  In Nierotko, the Court held that 
payments made under the National Labor Relations Act to employees who had been 
wrongfully discharged constitute wages under the Social Security Act.92  The Third, 
Sixth, and Eighth Circuits all discussed Nierotko and FICA wages, and in each 
instance, the court noted that it is proper to view wages broadly in that context.93  
While none of the courts at hand addressed the definition of wages at length, in each 
instance the court noted that coming to an understanding of the proper definition of 
FICA wages is the first and crucial step in the determination of the broader issue.94  
Although this issue was not greatly contested in these cases, this Note addresses 
the issue of appropriately defining FICA wages for two reasons.  First, the Sixth 
Circuit dissent argued that a broad interpretation of wages is incorrect.95  The second 
point, related to the first but more important, is that the broader issue of ERPs to 
tenured educators will resurface in another venue (or again in the Eighth Circuit).96  
Obviously, how any future court construes wages in the FICA context will have a 
substantial effect on the ultimate outcome of the broader ERP issue. 
In Nierotko, the National Labor Relations Board found that the respondent had 
been wrongfully discharged, reinstated him to his position, and awarded him back 
pay for the period of his discharge.97  Nierotko sought to have that payment credited 
                                                                
89
 I.R.C. § 3111(a). 
90
 Id. § 3121(b). 
91
 Nierotko, 327 U.S. at 358-71. 
92
 Id. at 364. 
93
 Univ. of Pittsburgh v. United States, 507 F.3d 165, 168 (3d Cir. 2007); Appoloni v. 
United States, 450 F.3d 185, 189-91 (6th Cir. 2006); N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 255 
F.3d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 2001). 
94
 Although the courts in these cases agreed with one another regarding the broad nature of 
wages in the FICA context, this is an important issue because there is no certainty that future 
courts to consider this issue will arrive at the same conclusion.  This is evident in the fact that 
each court identified wages and its proper definition as the foundational basis for 
determination of the broader issue. 
95
 Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 200-01. 
96
 The IRS has proclaimed its non-acquiescence to the Eighth Circuit’s holding in NDSU.  
N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599 (8th Cir. 2001), action on dec., 162899-04 
(Jan. 19, 2007).  See also discussion infra Part V.A.1. 
97
 Nierotko, 327 U.S. at 359-60. 
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to his Social Security insurance account, but the Social Security board refused on the 
basis that the payments did not constitute wages.98  The Court noted that Nierotko 
remained an employee during the period of his wrongful discharge, and therefore, 
the payments were issued from employer to employee.99 
The key issue in Nierotko was whether the payment constituted remuneration for 
service.100  The Court disagreed with the Social Security Board’s argument that 
Nierotko did not provide a service because he did not perform work in exchange for 
the payment.101  Instead, the Court noted that: 
The very words “any service . . . performed . . . for his employer,” with 
the purpose of the Social Security Act in mind, import breadth of 
coverage.  They admonish us against holding that “service” can be only 
productive activity.  We think that “service” as used by Congress in this 
definitive phrase means not only work actually done but the entire 
employer-employee relationship for which compensation is paid to the 
employee by the employer.102 
Therefore, in Nierotko, the Supreme Court declined to construe wages narrowly, and 
instead, recognized a broad definition of wages that emphasizes service in the 
context of the entire employment relationship.103 
In these cases considering the issue of ERPs to tenured educators, even the 
Eighth Circuit concluded that wages should be construed broadly in the FICA 
context.104  While the prevailing view recognizes the broad scope of wages, there are 
some who reject this interpretation.105  Notably, the dissent in Appoloni relied on 
                                                                
98
 Id. at 360. 
99
 Id. at 365. 
100
 Id. 
101
 Id. 
102
 Id. at 365-66 (alterations in original) (citation omitted in original). 
103
 See, e.g., Jeremy L. Hirsh, Note, The Wages of Not Working: FICA Liability for 
Severance Payments in Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. United States, 54 TAX LAW. 
811, 817 (2001) (“Nierotko teaches that the employment relationship is more than an 
agreement to exchange a fixed quantity of labor for compensation.”). 
104
 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
105
 Compare Hirsh, supra note 103 (recognizing the Supreme Court’s recognition in 
Nierotko that wages for purposes of section 3121 must be construed broadly to achieve 
Congress’s intent for the social security program), with Mary B. Hevener & Anne G. Batter, 
When Are Payments From an Employer to an Employee Not ‘Wages’ Subject to Employment 
Taxes?, 95 J. TAX’N 349, 350-54 (2001) (identifying two camps in this issue, those that accept 
the broad definition of wages in the FICA context and those that rely on Central Illinois 
Public Service Co. and its progeny); see also supra note 84.  Hevener and Batter argue that 
Central Illinois is “the primary judicial authority on the definition of wages.”  Hevener & 
Batter, supra, at 351.  The belief that there is only one correct definition of wages is clearly 
erroneous in light of the 1983 congressional amendments issued in reaction to Rowan, which 
followed Central Illinois.  In contrast, Hirsh correctly notes that “Congress amended section 
3121 in a manner which decoupled the interpretation of FICA wages from the interpretation of 
wages for income tax purposes . . . and that items of a compensatory nature that are exempt 
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Rowan Cos. v. United States106 in refuting the broad interpretation.107  The dissent 
argued that a broad interpretation of wages had been appropriate previously, but that 
the Supreme Court had rejected that view in Rowan.108 
In Rowan, the Supreme Court considered whether the value of meals and 
lodgings provided to employees for the convenience of the employer constituted 
wages for purposes of FICA taxation.109  The IRS relied on various Treasury 
regulations that indicated that the employee compensation would constitute wages.110  
The narrow holding of Rowan is that the relied-upon Treasury regulations were 
invalid because they failed to interpret wages in a consistent and reasonable 
manner.111  More broadly, the Court noted that Congress intended for wages to be 
interpreted consistently, regardless of the context.112 
So which argument is correct?  Perhaps the better question is when was which 
argument correct?  The dissent’s claim was correct, but only for a short time 
immediately after Rowan was handed down.  Congress amended the definition of 
wages in the FICA context in 1983113 by adding that statutory exclusions from wages 
in the context of income tax withholding “shall be construed to require a similar 
exclusion from ‘wages’ in the regulations prescribed for purposes of this chapter.”114  
The Congressional response to Rowan indicated that wages as defined in the FICA 
context must be distinguished from the narrower definition of income tax 
withholding wages in order to achieve the goals of the Social Security program.115 
                                                          
from income tax should not be exempted from FICA” unless expressly excepted in the statute.  
Hirsh, supra note 103, at 812. 
106
 Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981). 
107
 Appoloni v. United States, 450 F.3d 185, 200-01 (6th Cir. 2006) (Griffin, J., 
dissenting). 
108
 Id. 
109
 Rowan, 452 U.S. at 248. 
110
 Id. at 258-62. 
111
 Id. at 263. 
112
 Id. 
113
 S. REP. NO. 98-23, at 42 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 143, 183.  Congress 
discussed the current law prior to enactment of the amendments, noting that “amounts which 
constitute wages for income tax withholding purpose (Code sec. 3401) and amounts which 
constitute wages for social security tax purposes (Code sec. 3121) are separately defined.”  Id. 
The discussion continued by noting the Court’s holding in Rowan, which required that the 
corresponding code regulations must interpret wages identically in each context unless 
specific statutory provisions indicated otherwise.  Id. 
114
 I.R.C. § 3121(a) (2006).  With this amended language, Congress statutorily mandated 
that wages as defined in the FICA context is distinct and broader than the income-tax 
withholding context.  Id. 
115
 See S. REP. NO. 98-23, at 42.  In amending I.R.C. § 3121, Congress emphasized that: 
The social security program aims to replace the income of beneficiaries . . . .  Since the 
security system has objectives which are significantly different from the objective 
underlying the income tax withholding rules, the committee believes that amounts 
exempt from income tax withholding should not be exempt from FICA unless 
Congress provides an explicit FICA tax exclusion. 
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In light of the congressional response to Rowan, the argument forwarded by the 
Sixth Circuit dissent is untenable.  The dissent recognizes the 1983 amendments only 
in a single sentence, which continues with the claim that “the ‘broad interpretation’ 
of the definition of ‘wages’ for FICA purposes has not been restored.”116  
Assumedly, this broad definition that Rowan and Congress left behind is that 
proclaimed in Nierotko.  However, the Supreme Court never cited to Nierotko in 
Rowan.117  Furthermore, the Court’s rationale in Rowan relied on the assertion that 
Congress did not intend different definitions of wages that varied depending on the 
context.118  If Rowan might have been construed to refute a broad definition of wages 
in the FICA context, that view could only have been premised on the notion of a 
singular concept of wages.  But the 1983 amendments mandate that (1) the meaning 
of wages is not uniform in the FICA and income tax withholding contexts, and that 
(2) FICA wages are to be construed more broadly than wages related to income tax 
withholding.119  Therefore, the dissent’s claim that the broad concept of wages has 
not been restored is without merit.  The principles forwarded in Niertoko now, just as 
then, remain undisturbed. 
If the issue of whether ERPs made to tenured educators should come before 
another court, the view of wages in the FICA context must be construed broadly.  
However, this interpretation serves only as the proper foundation for consideration of 
the broader issue.  Recall that the Eighth Circuit agreed that wages should be 
construed broadly; nonetheless, that court held that ERPs to tenured educators do not 
constitute wages for FICA purposes.120  But only with a proper understanding of 
wages under FICA can courts correctly approach the question of whether such 
payments are made in exchange for service provided in the broad context of the 
employer-employee relationship121 or for “clear, separate, and adequate consideration 
. . . that is not dependent upon the employer-employee relationship and its 
component terms and conditions.”122 
IV.  REVENUE RULINGS 
IRS Revenue Rulings provide the information necessary to answer the question 
offered at the conclusion of the previous section.  Their significance in the outcome 
of the cases at hand cannot be understated.  In every instance, the parties on either 
side argued that the ERPs were analogous to the facts presented in different Revenue 
Rulings.  Furthermore, each court relied heavily on the purpose and rationale of the 
various Revenue Rulings in making its determination. 
                                                          
Id.  
116
 Appoloni v. United States, 450 F.3d 185, 201 (6th Cir. 2006) (Griffin, J., dissenting).  
117
 Id. at 191 n.1 (majority opinion).  The Sixth Circuit majority noted this fact in response 
to the dissent’s view of how to correctly interpret FICA wages.  Id. 
118
 Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 262-63 (1981). 
119
 See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. 
120
 N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599, 603, 607 (8th Cir. 2001). 
121
 Soc. Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1946). 
122
 See Rev. Rul. 2004-110, 2004-2 C.B. 41. 
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A.  What Are Revenue Rulings? 
A Revenue Ruling is defined as “an official interpretation by the [Internal 
Revenue] Service”123 on issues of “substantive tax law.”124  The authority to issue 
Revenue Rulings is statutorily granted by Congress to the IRS.125  While Revenue 
Rulings do not have the same legal force as Treasury regulations,126 Revenue Rulings 
serve “to provide precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases[] and may be 
cited and relied upon for that purpose.”127  Only the IRS National Office may issue 
Revenue Rulings.128  Revenue Rulings are published in the Internal Revenue 
Bulletin,129 which is published weekly and serves as “the authoritative instrument of 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.”130 
Revenue Rulings serve to inform and guide both IRS officials and taxpayers.131  
The IRS may not argue a position that is contrary to a current Revenue Ruling.132  
Revenue Rulings also serve two important functions for taxpayers.  First, relevant 
Revenue Rulings guide taxpayers as an effective tool in tax planning.133  Second, 
                                                                
123
 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a) (2009). 
124
 Id. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(a). 
125
 See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006).  Authority to promulgate Revenue Rulings is bestowed 
upon the IRS through the mandate of Congress that: 
Except where such authority is expressly given by this title to any person other than an 
officer or employee of the Treasury Department, the Secretary shall prescribe all 
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title, including all rules and 
regulations as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to 
internal revenue. 
Id.  
126
 See, e.g., Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r., 523 U.S. 382 (1998). 
127
 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d). 
128
 Id. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a).  
129
 Id. 
130
 Id. § 601.601(d)(2)(ii)(a)-(b). 
131
 Id. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a); see also id. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii).  This portion of the Treasury 
regulation expands on the purpose of Revenue Rulings, emphasizing that: 
The purpose of publishing revenue rulings and revenue procedures in the Internal 
Revenue Bulletin is to promote correct and uniform application of the tax laws by 
Internal Revenue Service employees and to assist taxpayers in attaining maximum 
voluntary compliance by informing Service personnel and the public of National 
Office interpretations of the internal revenue laws, related statutes, treaties, 
regulations, and statements of Service procedures affecting the rights and duties of 
taxpayers. 
Id.  
132
 See, e.g., Estate of McLendon v. Comm’r., 135 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
the IRS may not depart from a Revenue Ruling in an individual case where the law is unclear). 
133
 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(e). 
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Revenue Rulings are listed as appropriate authority134 for taxpayer-use to avoid 
understatement penalties.135 
B.  Revenue Rulings Merit Judicial Deference 
The Supreme Court has left open the question of what level of judicial deference 
IRS Revenue Rulings merit.136  It is beyond the scope of this Note to offer a 
definitive answer as to what specific level of deference is appropriate.137  However, a 
primary purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that Revenue Rulings merit at least 
some level of judicial deference.138  Addressing this broader issue is crucial to the 
specific issue of ERPs made to tenured educators because Revenue Rulings will 
undoubtedly play an important role in the ultimate resolution of that issue. 
Likewise, it is beyond the scope of this Note to provide a survey of the historical 
development of judicial deference to administrative rulemaking and interpretations.  
However, it is impossible to consider this issue without a basic understanding of the 
principles forwarded by the Supreme Court in two key cases: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.  
v. Natural Resources Defense Council139 and United States v. Mead Corp.140  
In Chevron, the Supreme Court considered whether the course of action pursued 
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in relation to the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1997 was based on a reasonable statutory interpretation.141  The 
Court upheld the EPA’s interpretation,142 but it more broadly ruled that 
administrative interpretations merit judicial deference when a statute is either 
                                                                
134
 Id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii). 
135
 I.R.C. § 6662 (2006); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b)(2).  
136
 United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 220 (2001). 
137
 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: 
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1091-92 (2008) (arguing that Revenue Rulings merit only Skidmore 
deference).  Eskridge and Baer suggest that Skidmore deference should be the default when 
any court considers an agency interpretation “when (a) the agency has expertise on issues as to 
which judges do not; (b) the agency has rendered a reasoned judgment after input from the 
public; and/or (c) there has been public or private reliance on agency rules or guidances.”  Id. 
at 1092.  While the authors discuss agency inputs generally, Revenue Rulings fall under the 
Skidmore category they identify.  Compare id., with Ryan C. Morris, Comment, Substantially 
Deferring to Revenue Rulings After Mead, 2005 BYU L. REV. 999, 1040-46 (arguing that 
Revenue Rulings merit Chevron deference).  Morris identifies the authority and procedures for 
the promulgation of Revenue Rulings, and concludes that “[f]airly formal, fair, and deliberate 
procedures under a general grant of authority deserve Chevron’s heightened deference.”  Id. at 
1046. 
138
 See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text. 
139
 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
140
 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
141
 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839-40. 
142
 Id. at 866. 
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ambiguous or Congress intentionally left a gap for the agency to fill, and the 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable.143 
The Court limited the application of Chevron deference in Mead.144  The Mead 
Court addressed whether a United States Customs Service interpretation of the 
Customs Act merited Chevron deference.145  The Court held that the agency 
interpretation had no plausible claim to Chevron deference because Congress did not 
“intend[] such a ruling to carry the force of law.”146  The Court noted that the 
Customs Service did not engage in notice-and-comment procedures147 when issuing 
the classifications, which bound only specified parties and could not extend to third 
parties, and that 46 different offices issued from 10,000 to 15,000 classifications 
annually.148 
However, the Court emphasized that, despite the fact that the Customs Service 
interpretation did not merit Chevron deference, all administrative interpretations 
merit some level of judicial deference.149  The Court cited Chevron for the 
proposition that considerable weight is always due to interpretations by agencies 
charged with administering the statutes,150 and the Court referred to the notions of 
deference articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., which is characterized by 
considerable deference to well-reasoned, consistent administrative judgment.151 
Unlike the Customs Service classifications in Mead,152 Revenue Rulings carry the 
“force of law.”153  Although Revenue Rulings, generally, are not issued pursuant to 
                                                                
143
 Id. at 843-44. 
144
 Mead, 533 U.S. at 218. 
145
 Id. at 221. 
146
 Id.  
147
 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).  The Administrative Procedure Act requires government 
agencies to first introduce proposed regulations and solicit comments from the general public 
before the regulations can be finalized.  Id. 
148
 Mead, 533 U.S. at 233. 
149
 Id. at 227-28; see also Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002). 
150
 Mead, 533 U.S. at 227-28 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
467 U.S. 831, 844 (1984) (“[A]nd ‘[w]e have long recognized that considerable weight should 
be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to 
administer . . . .’”) (second alteration in original)). 
151
 Id. at 228 (“The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute 
has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the 
agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of 
the agency’s position.” (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944) 
(footnotes omitted)). 
152
 The Mead classifications were more like IRS private letter rulings (PLRs), which may 
be cited as precedent only by the individual taxpayers to whom the letters are issued.  26 
C.F.R. § 6110(k)(3) (2009).  A series of PLRs is merely a predictor of the position the IRS 
will take, and in no way constitutes precedent for third parties.  Id.   
153
 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27, 230-31. 
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comment-and-notice procedures,154 the IRS promulgates Revenue Rulings pursuant 
to its statutory authority to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the 
enforcement of” the Internal Revenue Code.155  Revenue Rulings are formal 
interpretative rulings by the IRS involving “substantive tax law.”156  The Supreme 
Court has referred to the IRS as the “primary authority” of the Internal Revenue 
Code, noting that: 
[E]ver since the inception of the tax code, Congress has seen fit to vest in 
those administering the tax laws very broad authority to interpret those 
laws.  In an area as complex as the tax system, the agency Congress vests 
with administrative responsibility must be able to exercise its authority to 
meet changing conditions and new problems.157 
Additionally, the Supreme Court articulated what it identified as the proper 
relationship between the agency, the legislature, and the judiciary: the IRS must 
remain free to interpret the Code, and Congress, which provides the IRS with this 
authority, may modify what it deems to be improper Revenue Rulings, while courts 
should serve only to review IRS conduct.158 
Furthermore, only the IRS National Office issues these “official interpretations” 
that are meant to guide taxpayers and IRS officials alike.159  Revenue Rulings have 
legal force and effect, as “precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases” that 
“may be cited and relied upon for that purpose.”160  The Commissioner may not 
argue against a standing Revenue Ruling, and taxpayers who disregard Revenue 
Rulings can be subjected to penalties.161 
It should be evident that the notion that Revenue Rulings merit no judicial 
deference stands in direct opposition to the Supreme Court’s recognition of 
deference in Mead.162  Many judicial bodies have recognized this and have noted that 
Revenue Rulings must merit at least some judicial deference.163  However, there are 
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 Revenue Rulings can be issued pursuant to notice-and-comment procedures.  See John 
F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 79 & n.300 (1995) (recognizing that the IRS requested comments on 
a proposed Revenue Ruling in Announcement 95-25, 1995-14 I.R.B. 11). 
155
 I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006). 
156
 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(a). 
157
 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983); see also United States v. 
Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001). 
158
 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 596-97. 
159
 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a). 
160
 Id. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d). 
161
  I.R.C. § 6662 (2006); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b)(2).  
162
 Mead, 533 U.S. at 227-28. 
163
 See, e.g., id. at 228 (discussing a spectrum of deference, ranging from great deference 
to “near indifference at the other.” (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 
212-213 (1988)) (representing the “near indifference” referred to in Mead, in which an 
administrative interpretation was proffered for the first time in a litigation brief)).  Even under 
these facts, the Court did not suggest that the administrative interpretation merited no 
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some, most notably the Tax Court, that disagree.164  This perception is flawed.  Based 
on their authority and purpose, Revenue Rulings merit at least the substantial 
deference the Supreme Court recognized in Mead.165 
C.  Revenue Rulings and Future Implications 
The courts in the cases at hand accurately considered the question of judicial 
deference and correctly decided that Revenue Rulings merit substantial deference.166  
Future courts to consider the issue of ERPs to tenured educators should afford the 
same deference that the Third, Sixth, and Eighth167 Circuits have extended to the 
relevant IRS Revenue Rulings.168  This is important for two reasons.  First, as will be 
discussed further below, the IRS has modified the Revenue Rulings pertinent to this 
issue, which will significantly affect any subsequent litigation.169  Second, the IRS 
                                                          
deference whatsoever.  See also Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 
2004) (relying expressly on Mead, the court recognized that “[w]hether or not Chevron 
deference is appropriately applied here, obviously some level of deference to the agency ruling 
is due.”); Omohundro v. United States, 300 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Skidmore 
deference to uphold a Revenue Ruling that stood in opposition to one of the court’s earlier 
decisions). 
164
 See Estate of McLendon v. Comm’r., 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 42 (1996) (holding that 
“[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, revenue rulings are viewed as ‘merely an opinion of a 
lawyer in the agency’, they are not considered to have the effect of law, and they are not 
binding on the Commissioner or the courts.” (citing Foil v. Comm’r., 920 F.2d 1196, 1201 
(5th Cir. 1990), aff’g 92 T.C. 376 (1989))); see also Appoloni v. United States, 450 F.3d 185, 
203 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Revenue Rulings at issue . . . are persuasive authority at best.”).  
The Tax Court’s notion that these official agency interpretations are merely equivalent to an 
attorney’s argument forwarded during litigation ignores the purpose and authority for Revenue 
Rulings.  See discussion supra Part IV.  Furthermore, this position would seem to contradict 
the Golsen rule, at least when a controversy before the Tax Court could result in appeal to a 
circuit that has recognized that Revenue Rules merit at least some judicial deference.  See 
supra note 5. 
165
 Mead, 533 U.S. at 227-28. 
166
 Univ. of Pittsburgh v. United States, 507 F. 3d  165, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2007); Appoloni, 
450 F.3d at 194; N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599, 603-04, n.6 (8th Cir. 2001). 
167
 This proposition is especially interesting in light of the possibility of this issue 
resurfacing in the Eighth Circuit.  The court expressly deferred to the IRS Revenue Rulings, 
stating that “[b]ecause there is no case law directly on point, we find revenue rulings 
especially useful in analyzing the issue before us.”  N.D. State Univ., 255 F.3d at 604 n.6. 
168
 If the Supreme Court were to take up this ERP question, it is unlikely that it would 
answer the question of the precise level of deference that Revenue Rulings merit.  See United 
States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001).  However, the Court 
would accord some deference under Mead and analyze the Revenue Rulings accordingly.  
However, the Court might provide a definitive answer if a new circuit considered the ERP 
issue and specifically held that Revenue Rulings merit no judicial deference.  When, if ever, 
the Supreme Court provides a conclusive answer to this question, this author suggests that the 
Court would likely deny Chevron deference to Revenue Rulings but continue to accord them 
great deference under Mead. 
169
 See Rev. Rul. 2004-110, 2004-2 C.B. 960. 
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issued a statement of non-acquiescence in the Eighth Circuit’s NDSU decision.170  
But the IRS later revised this statement and avowed to treat ERPs to tenured 
educators as wages subject to FICA and to pursue litigation when necessary, even in 
the Eighth Circuit, as long as those ERPs were issued after January 11, 2005.171  As a 
result, a circuit split remains that involves a costly and recurring issue of federal 
taxation.  Therefore, there is a very high likelihood that this issue will resurface in 
the circuit courts. 
With the arguments for judicial deference to Revenue Rulings outlined above, 
what remains is the more substantive analysis of the various rulings relevant to the 
question of whether ERPs to tenured educators constitute wages.  This analysis, 
however, is possible only after laying the appropriate foundation: the broader 
analysis of judicial deference and Revenue Rulings correctly leads to the principle 
that courts should afford great deference to IRS Revenue Rulings.  This analysis 
establishes the appropriate framework for courts to enter the substantive examination 
of the individual Revenue Rulings. 
V.  THE REVENUE RULINGS AT HAND IN THE THREE CASES 
Even within the appropriate framework of judicial deference to Revenue Rulings, 
courts arrive at different conclusions as to how various rulings analogize to the 
underlying facts of the issues before them.  This is due, in part, to the fact that 
Revenue Rulings apply to a limited set of facts rather than to a general issue.172  This 
explains how the parties involved in the ERP controversy attempted to analogize at 
least three different Revenue Rulings to the facts at hand and how three courts came 
to very different and divided conclusions. 
There are three Revenue Rulings with potential application to the issue of ERPs 
made to tenured educators.  Revenue Ruling 75-44 addresses accrued employment 
rights, indicating that payments to employees in exchange for the waiver of seniority 
rights under a general, indefinite employment contract do constitute wages subject to 
FICA.173  Revenue Ruling 58-301 indicates that a payment to an employee for the 
cancellation of an existing employment contract does not constitute wages for FICA 
purposes.174  However, the IRS has subsequently issued Revenue Ruling 2004-110, 
which expressly supersedes Revenue Ruling 58-301 and confirms that the IRS 
considers as wages any payments made after January 2005 to employees in exchange 
for the cancellation of an employment contract.175 
                                                                
170
 See N.D. State Univ., 255 F.3d 599 (2001), action on dec., 2001-08 (Jan. 1, 2002). 
171
 See N.D. State Univ., 255 F.3d 599 (2001), revised action on dec., 2007-01 (Jan. 18, 
2007). 
172
 See 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(a) (2009) (“The conclusions expressed in Revenue 
Rulings will be directly responsive to and limited in scope by the pivotal facts stated in the 
[R]evenue [R]uling.”). 
173
 See Rev. Rul. 75-44, 1975-1 C.B. 15. 
174
 See Rev. Rul. 58-301, 1958-1 C.B 23. 
175
 Rev. Rul. 2004-110, 2004-2 C.B. 960 (“Rev. Ruls. 55-520 and 58-301 modified and 
superseded.”). 
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A.  Which Revenue Ruling is most Analogous? 
1.  Revenue Rule 2004-110: Stay Tuned 
The IRS expressly indicated that Revenue Rule 2004-110 would not be applied 
retroactively.176  However, the payments at issue in Appoloni and University of 
Pittsburgh were made prior to the IRS’s issuance of Rule 2004-110.177  Accordingly, 
the ruling had no bearing on the outcome in either case, as each court acknowledged 
it but correctly declined to consider it in the analysis of the wage issue.178  That does 
not mean, however, that Rule 2004-110 is irrelevant to this discussion of the current 
disagreement among the circuits.  On the contrary, Rule 2004-110 provides the 
definitive answer regarding the status of ERPs made to tenured educators and should 
be the key to mending the circuit split.179 
The fact that Rule 2004-110 did not apply to the Appoloni or University of 
Pittsburgh ERPs is immaterial to the outcome in both the Sixth and Third Circuits, as 
each would have obviously come to the same conclusion if consideration of that 
ruling had been appropriate.  Instead, the role of Revenue Rule 2004-110 in this 
issue will be played out in the future.  The proper questions are when and how will 
the issue of ERP payments to tenured educators resurface, and how will the circuit 
split be resolved?  Revenue Rule 2004-110 will provide the answers. 
As to when and how the issue will resurface, a plausible reason that the Supreme 
Court has declined to consider this issue to date is because of the timing of the 
Appoloni and University of Pittsburgh payments in relation to Rule 2004-110.  It 
seems likely that the Supreme Court would have addressed this issue if not for the 
fact that Rule 2004-110 did not apply to the payments at issue in those cases.  
Instead, the Supreme Court recognized the benefit of waiting until this issue comes 
before another circuit court or resurfaces in the Eighth Circuit so that the wage status 
of ERPs can be considered in light of Revenue Rule 2004-110. 
When that occurs, the framework detailed in this Note should govern.  Any future 
court to consider the status of ERPs to tenured educators should (1) operate under the 
broad definition of wages in the FICA context, and (2) afford considerable deference 
to Revenue Rule 2004-110.  This should hold true whether the issue comes as a 
matter of first impression before a new circuit or resurfaces in the Eighth Circuit.  It 
is telling that even the Sixth Circuit dissent noted that, if applicable, 2004-110 would 
support the IRS’s contention that the ERPs constituted wages.180 
                                                                
176
 See 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(c) (“Where Revenue Rulings revoke or modify 
rulings previously published . . . the new rulings will not be applied retroactively to the extent 
that the new rulings have adverse tax consequences to taxpayers.”). 
177
 See Univ. of Pittsburgh v. United States, 507 F.3d 165, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Appoloni v. United States, 450 F.3d 185, 194 n.4 (6th Cir. 2006). 
178
 See Univ. of Pittsburgh, 507 F.3d at 169-70; Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 194 n.4.  
179
 See infra note 184. 
180
 Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 204 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (explaining that “Ruling 2004-110 
generally supports the government’s position”).  The dissent also noted the plaintiffs’ 
argument that Rule 2004-110 “was promulgated in anticipation of litigation.”  Id.  This notion 
confuses a basic point about Revenue Rulings, which is that one of their primary purposes is 
to indicate to taxpayers how the IRS will proceed.  This applies, not only to the assessment of 
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There are two possible scenarios for resolution of this issue and the mending of 
the circuit split.  One possibility is that the issue will very likely come before a 
different circuit.  Regardless of the outcome in that circuit (although a finding of 
wages appears now to be the only appropriate outcome in light of the promulgation 
of Rule 2004-110 and the abandonment of Rule 58-301), the Supreme Court would 
likely accept the issue and resolve the split in favor of the IRS.  The second scenario 
is that the issue will resurface in the Eighth Circuit, which would be the preferred 
option for two reasons.  First, the Eighth Circuit could reverse its decision in NDSU 
without altering its rationale.  The court found that the purpose of the payments was 
to buy back tenure rights from the professors.  Although the underlying rationale is 
erroneous, as will be discussed below, this ruling would remain undisturbed with the 
application of Rule 2004-110.  The court would merely defer, once again, to the 
valid and applicable Revenue Ruling most analogous to the facts at hand.  Second, 
the likelihood that the Supreme Court will need to address the issue will decrease 
dramatically.  Whereas it is almost certain that the Court would accept the issue 
should it come before a different circuit, there will be no need if the Eighth 
reconsiders the issue in light of Rule 2004-110 and mends the split between the 
circuits on its own.181  And if the Eighth Circuit maintains its present stance, the 
Supreme Court would simply be in the same position as if the issue had come before 
another circuit. 
2.  Revenue Rules 75-44 and 58-301 
Despite the changes that have occurred since these cases were decided, the 
Eighth Circuit nonetheless incorrectly decided that Revenue Rule 58-301 was more 
analogous to the NDSU facts than Rule 75-44.182  Rule 58-301 on its face was a 
relevant consideration because it involved relinquishment of contractual rights.183  
However, instead of finding Rule 75-44 more analogous than Rule 58-301 by 
focusing on the service aspect inherent in the employer-employee context of the 
ERPs, the court erred by concluding that the university was buying back the tenure 
rights relinquished by its employees.  This narrow perception is incorrect for two 
reasons: (1) concern for relinquished contractual rights should focus on how 
employees obtained the right, rather than what right was relinquished, especially in 
an instance such as this where (2) relinquishment of the contractual right was merely 
incidental to the receipt of payment made for a clearly distinct and valid purpose.184 
                                                          
tax liability but, also, to the resolution of tax controversy through litigation.  By their very 
nature, Revenue Rulings in at least some sense anticipate litigation.  It would be another story 
had the IRS issued Rule 2004-110 during the litigation and argued that the court should defer 
to the newly fashioned agency interpretation. 
181
 This outcome would be appropriate and would mirror the correct stance taken by the 
Ninth Circuit in Omohundra.  See supra note 163. 
182
 N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599, 607 (8th Cir. 2001). 
183
 See Rev. Rul. 58-301, 1958-1 C.B. 23. 
184
 There is a subtle distinction between the Eighth Circuit’s holding and the position 
articulated in Rule 2004-110.  While the court held that the purpose of the ERP payments was 
to buy tenure rights, N.D. State Univ., 255 F.3d at 607, Rule 2004-110 indicates that the 
payments it refers to are made for the purpose of canceling the contract, which incidentally 
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The Eighth Circuit held that NDSU paid the professors for only the act of 
relinquishing their tenure rights.185  According to the court, this is the fact that 
brought the ERPs squarely under Rule 58-301.186  The court rejected the applicability 
of Rule 75-44 based on the notion that two tenured professors experience two 
relationships with a university, the at-will pre-tenure period and the subsequent 
period characterized by possession of tenure rights.187  And although past 
performance and current salary were considered in the determination of the ERP 
amounts, the court discounted these factors simply because there had been no 
express limit imposed as to what factors could be considered.188  Instead, the court 
concluded that the fact that professors obtain tenure at the onset of a second 
relationship invalidated the argument that ERPs, which necessarily included 
relinquishment of tenure, were based on past service.189 
In contrast, both the Sixth and Third Circuits focused on the ERP program 
eligibility requirements and the nature of the employment relationship.190  Both 
courts noted that the participation in the programs required a minimum number of 
years of service, and both past service and current salary were key factors in 
determining the ERP amounts.191  The courts noted that overall longevity was the 
primary consideration and that the tenured period in isolation was irrelevant.192  
Tenure was merely an eligibility requirement, and relinquishment of tenure rights 
was simply incidental to participation in the program.193  Furthermore, the proper 
inquiry should focus on how a contractual right is obtained, not on the right itself.194  
Accordingly, both the Sixth and Third Circuits held that tenure rights are clearly 
obtained exclusively through service to an employer, and as such, Rule 75-44 was 
most analogous to the ERPs.195 
The Eighth Circuit’s ruling in NDSU hinges on the declaration that tenured 
educators and educational institutions maintain two successive relationships.196  But 
                                                          
involves the relinquishment of certain rights.  See Rev. Rul. 2004-110, 2004-2 C.B. 960; see 
also discussion infra Part V.B. 
185
 N.D. State Univ., 255 F.3d at 607. 
186
 Id. 
187
 Id. at 606. 
188
 Id. at 606-07.  Other factors mentioned included curriculum needs and budget 
constraints.  Id. at 601.  It is difficult to understand why those factors would make any 
difference because curriculum needs and budget constraints are clearly concerns of the 
employer and, therefore, fall directly within context of employer-employee relationship. 
189
 Id. at 606. 
190
 Univ. of Pittsburgh v. United States, 507 F.3d 165, 171-74 (3d Cir. 2007); Appoloni v. 
United States, 450 F.3d 185, 195 (6th Cir. 2006).  
191
 Univ. of Pittsburgh, 507 F.3d at 171-74; Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 195. 
192
 Univ. of Pittsburgh, 507 F.3d at 171-74; Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 195. 
193
 Univ. of Pittsburgh, 507 F.3d at 171; Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 192. 
194
 Univ. of Pittsburgh, 507 F.3d at 174; Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 192-93. 
195
 Univ. of Pittsburgh, 507 F.3d at 173; Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 193-94. 
196
 N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599, 606 (8th Cir. 2001). 
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it is unclear how what appears to be a simple play on words should be interpreted in 
such a way that the first relationship prior to a grant of tenure falls outside the scope 
of employment while the second relationship characterized by tenure lies within the 
employer-employee relationship.197  Even a finding that the grant of tenure 
constitutes a new position does not change the fact that both positions fall within the 
broad employment relationship between the parties. 
Consider an employee who works for one employer but, after five years in that 
job, accepts a new position with the same employer.  No one would argue that the 
employer-employee relationship is somehow divested of those previous five years of 
service and begins afresh upon entry into the position.  When that employee retires, 
for example after thirty total years of service, neither party would claim that the 
employee had worked for the employer for only twenty-five years by omitting the 
first five years served in a different position.  Clearly, the employment relationship 
spanned thirty years. 
Likewise, the broad employer-employee relationship at issue spanned the entire 
length of employment, whether or not it could be construed as distinct periods 
characterized by pre- or post-grant of tenure.  Therefore, the Eighth Circuit 
incorrectly held that the ERPs were not wages under Rule 58-301 based on this 
contrived view of tenure and its impact on the employment relationship.  As the 
Sixth Circuit correctly concluded, “just because a teacher relinquishes a right when 
accepting early retirement does not convert what would be FICA wages into 
something else.”198 
B.  The Revenue Rulings and the Principle of Purpose 
Why did the Eighth Circuit focus on this concept of two successive relationships?  
The answer is simple, and it reinforces the argument that courts must give some 
deference to IRS Revenue Rulings.  The Eighth Circuit’s wordplay represents the 
only means by which the court could formulate a ruling that would fall under Rule 
58-301.  However, the NDSU opinion was incorrectly decided, despite the fact that 
Rule 2004-110 subsequently superseded Rule 58-301.  Although the court acted 
appropriately by deferring to a valid IRS Revenue Rule, the court was so focused on 
presenting an argument that supported the outcome mandated in Rule 58-301 that it 
ignored the underlying principle of purpose.  Had the court kept the principle of 
purpose at the heart of its analysis—both the purpose of tenure itself and the purpose 
of the ERP program—the Eighth Circuit would have correctly held that Rule 75-44, 
not 58-301, was more analogous and that the payments constituted wages subject to 
FICA. 
1.  The Purpose of Tenure 
In order to determine the purpose of tenure, one need only examine the rights an 
educator receives upon a grant of tenure.  Tenure “lays no claim whatever to a 
guarantee of lifetime employment.  Rather, tenure provides only that no person 
                                                                
197
 See, e.g., Mark L. Adams, The Quest for Tenure: Job Security and Academic Freedom, 
56 CATH. U. L. REV. 67, 74 (2006) (“The awarding of tenure thus changes the employment-at-
will relationship.” (emphasis added)).  Adams correctly notes that a grant of tenure only 
modifies the existing relationship by adding previously unavailable protections.  Id. 
198
 Appoloni, 450 F.3d at 192. 
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continuously retained as a full-time faculty member beyond a specified lengthy 
period of probationary service may thereafter be dismissed without adequate 
cause.”199  The American Association of University Professors proclaims that tenure 
protects two specific rights of educators: academic freedom and the procedural due 
process rights that afford a sense of job, and, therefore, economic security.200  The 
Supreme Court has recognized academic freedom as an essential right associated 
with the First Amendment.201  This important right frees educators to inquire, teach, 
and publish without outside interference, which, in turn, brings to fruition the 
institution’s goal of achieving an environment conducive to liberal education.202  The 
due process rights associated with tenure means that termination of employment 
must be preceded by rigorous and extensive procedures not unlike a trial that confirm 
the existence of just cause.203 
What do these most basic purposes of tenure, the protection of academic 
freedom, and provision of procedural due process in the face of termination, have in 
common?  These rights hold significance and power only within the scope of the 
                                                                
199
 See William Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary, Explanation, and “Defense”, 57 
AAUP BULL. 328, 328 (1971). 
200
 See AAUP, 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE WITH 
1970 INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS, reprinted in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3, 3 (10th 
ed. 2006).  The AAUP’s 1940 Statement was drafted by faculty and administration 
representatives from American universities and has been endorsed by the American 
Association of University Professors, which represents hundreds of institutions of higher 
learning and professional organizations.  Adams, supra note 197. 
201
 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 
603 (1967) (“Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of 
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.”); Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (“Teachers and students must always remain free to 
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our 
civilization will stagnate and die.”). 
202
 See, e.g., Merton C. Bernstein, Essay, In Praise of Tenure: A Cautionary Essay, 71 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1019 (1993) (arguing that the existence of academic freedom is 
dependant on the tenure system); Ralph S. Brown & Jordan E. Kurland, Academic Tenure and 
Academic Freedom, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 355 (1990) (“The economic and social 
costs of the tenure system are . . . outweighed by the fact that tenure is vital to academic 
freedom.”); Robert B. Conrad & Louis A. Trosch, Renewable Tenure, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 551, 
553 (1998) (“Academic freedom and academic tenure fit together like a hand and glove.  
Academic tenure is the glove that protects its hand, freedom of speech and freedom of inquiry 
within the academic setting.”).  
203
 See, e.g., Brian G. Brooks, Adequate Cause for Dismissal: The Missing Element in 
Academic Freedom, 22 J.C. & U.L. 331, 340-41(1995) (arguing that procedural due process, 
namely termination only for good cause, is a necessary component of academic freedom); 
James J. Fishman, Tenure and Its Discontents: The Worst Form of Employment Relationship 
Save All of the Others, 21 PACE L. REV. 159, 182-83 (2000) (arguing that, without the security 
of tenure’s due process rights, “much experiment, scholarship and intellectual risk would not 
be undertaken.”); Michael J. Phillips, The Substantive Due Process Rights of College and 
University Faculty, 28 AM. BUS. L.J. 567, 597 (1991) (noting that the property interest in 
tenure enables tenured faculty to “use substantive due process to attack dismissals based on 
cause or financial exigency.”). 
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employment relationship between an educator and an academic institution.  The 
Eighth Circuit incorrectly concluded that the ERPs were made to buy back tenure 
rights because the court either ignored or misunderstood that the underlying purpose 
of tenure is to serve and protect both the employer and employee during the period of 
service.  Quite simply, the tenure rights of individual educators have no use or value 
to either the employees or the employer outside the employment relationship. 
The fact that tenure rights have meaning or value only if considered in relation to 
service in the employment context stands in stark contrast to the position forwarded 
by the Eighth Circuit.  The court opined that the educators at North Dakota State 
University “did not receive what they were entitled to under their contracts, which 
was continued employment absent . . . adequate cause for termination.  Rather they 
gave up those rights.”204  This statement reflects the belief that tenure, by definition, 
guarantees lifetime employment.  This logic is as faulty as the logic noted above, 
which concluded that tenure is granted automatically.  While tenure often results in 
lifetime employment, it is illogical to suggest that it is a guarantee.  One need look 
no farther than the basic due process rights that tenure affords to understand this.  
What need would tenured educators have for a right that protects them from 
termination without the guarantee and protection of certain procedures if termination 
itself was impossible? 
In addition to this misperception concerning tenure, the Eighth Circuit missed 
another essential point.  Even if the employees were truly entitled to “continued 
employment” as the court suggested, does that not imply that continued employment 
for only as long as those employees desired?  But the educators in these cases chose 
to retire, which means that they had received continual employment until the point 
that they chose to forsake that continued employment for retirement.  And, as 
demonstrated above, the rights of tenure have value and meaning only within the 
scope of service of the employee to the employer.  Academic freedom protects 
tenured educators during employment; what is the value of due process rights related 
to termination to an individual who has retired?  The Eighth Circuit failed to 
recognize that these educators did receive the full measure of tenure during their 
employment and that once they voluntarily entered into an early retirement 
agreement, the meaning and value of tenure was removed.  
Clearly these educators would have continued to receive the full measure of their 
tenure rights had they not retired early.  Accordingly, they would have maintained 
those rights until the time of what could be termed their “normal” time of retirement.  
The obvious reality that no educator entering a “normal” retirement would be 
compensated at that point for relinquishing tenure is final proof that the Eighth 
Circuit misunderstood or ignored the true purpose of tenure.  The court emphasized 
that Revenue Ruling 58-301 was most analogous based on the fact that the educators 
relinquished tenure, thereby not receiving the full measure of rights associated with 
tenure.205  The Eighth Circuit’s effort to provide an argument that fit under Rule 58-
301 was inadequate and incorrect.  The purpose of tenure indicates that the ERPs 
were necessarily made for services within the employment context.  As such, the 
court should have rejected Rule 58-301 in favor of Rule 75-44 and held that the 
ERPs constituted wages subject to FICA. 
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 N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599, 607 (8th Cir. 2001). 
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2.  The Purpose of the ERP Program 
Directly related to the purpose of tenure is the purpose of the ERP program itself.  
What would academic institutions receive if the ERPs were made to buy tenure 
rights?  Would they be buying the academic freedom protections or the right to due 
process procedures that tenured educators enjoy?  The same discussion related to the 
retiring employees applies to the employer, and the obvious answer is that 
relinquished tenure rights likewise have no value or meaning to academic 
institutions.  Instead, the primary goal of early retirement programs generally is to 
reduce costs while providing a compensatory benefit to valued employees who have 
provided years of service and achieved higher scales of pay.206 
There is, however, one scenario where the Eighth Circuit’s rationale and reliance 
on Revenue Rule 58-301 would have been appropriate.  Consider an instance where 
an institution compensated educators for relinquishing tenure rights with the 
stipulation that those individuals would maintain their employment.207  This would 
truly be a situation where the institution’s purpose is to buy tenure rights.  However, 
outside of this narrow set of facts, the Eighth Circuit’s holding that the academic 
institution’s purpose was to buy tenure rights is merely an example of form over 
substance.  Announcing in form that the ERPs are made to buy tenure does not trump 
the substance.  The substantive reality is that the academic institutions receive 
nothing from the rights their employees relinquish, and those employees simply walk 
away presently from what they would walk away from later; except, they do so 
presently with added compensation paid in recognition for their valued years of 
service.  Finding that such payments constitute wages correctly recognizes that the 
transaction results in a win-win for parties connected by the service of one to the 
other in the employment context. 
                                                                
206
 See, e.g., Pamela Perun, Phased Retirement Programs for the Twenty-First Century 
Workplace, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 633, 664 (2002) (noting that academic early retirement 
programs, which are the only type of early retirement programs that have been expressly 
authorized by law, strike an effective balance between the needs of both parties in the 
employment relationship). 
207
 See, e.g., Sam Dillon, A School Chief Takes on Tenure, Stirring a Fight, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 13, 2008, at A1 (highlighting a proposal wherein secondary school teachers would 
choose between two compensation plans, one of which would require the relinquishment of 
tenure); James J. Fishman, Tenure: Endangered or Evolutionary Species, 38 AKRON L. REV. 
771, 781-82 (2005) (suggesting that the tenure system will survive, but only by adapting 
socially sensitive procedures, such as extending the probationary period in order to 
accommodate family planning); Ernest van den Haag, Academic Freedom and Tenure, 15 
PACE L. REV. 5, 7 (1994) (noting that universities in England have abolished the tenure 
system); Constance Hawke, Commentary, Tenure’s Tenacity in Higher Education, 120 ED. 
LAW REP. 621, 635-36 (1997) (noting a variety of plans wherein professors retain 
employment, but relinquish tenure in exchange for various incentives); Robert W. McGee & 
Walter E. Block, Academic Tenure: An Economic Critique, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 545, 
561 (1991) (proposing a market driven approach that would enable universities to retain 
accreditation while choosing whether they want to operate under the tenure system); Fred L. 
Morrison, Tenure Wars: An Account of the Controversy at Minnesota, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 369, 
369 (1997) (recounting the struggles of the “Tenure Wars at [the University of] Minnesota” 
over proposed modifications to the tenure system in place at that institution).  
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss1/8
2010] A QUESTION OF PURPOSE 245 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Eighth Circuit incorrectly ruled that ERPs made to tenured educators do not 
constitute wages subject to FICA taxation.208  The court premised this decision on the 
flawed rationale that academic institutions provide ERP programs to tenured 
educators for the purpose of buying back tenure rights.209  Accordingly, the court 
erroneously held that the facts at hand were most analogous to Revenue Ruling 58-
301.210 
In contrast, the Sixth and Third Circuits correctly held that such payments are 
FICA wages.211  These decisions were based on the principle that a tenured 
relationship is one based on past service of an employee to the employer; 
accordingly, the courts correctly held that the facts in those cases were most 
analogous to Revenue Ruling 75-44.212 
This circuit split involves a costly and recurring issue of federal taxation that 
requires resolution.  This matter is also complicated by the fact that the IRS has 
promulgated Revenue Rule 2004-110, which modified and superseded Rule 58-
301.213  A Revenue Ruling may not be applied retroactively if it supersedes an 
existing ruling and application would have a detrimental effect on the taxpayers in 
controversy.214  The complicating factor arises in the fact that Rule 2004-110 was 
promulgated after the ERPs in Appoloni and University of Pittsburgh had been made 
but before those cases were decided.215  Therefore, no court has yet considered this 
issue in light of Rule 2004-110. 
This Note identifies a framework by which courts should consider the broad issue 
of whether ERPs made to tenured educators constitute FICA wages.  First, a court 
should consider the definition of wages in the FICA context and hold that FICA 
wages must be construed broadly.216  Second, any court to address this issue will 
certainly be presented with arguments concerning the application of Revenue 
Rulings.  Accordingly, courts should find that Revenue Rulings merit at least some 
judicial deference.217  Therefore, any court to examine this issue, even the Eighth 
Circuit, should the issue come before that court again, should determine that 
Revenue Ruling 2004-110 directly applies to the issue of ERPs to tenured educators 
and hold that such payments constitute FICA wages. 
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